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Kobos: Kyllo v. United States

NOTE

KYLLO V. UNITED STATES: A LUKEWARM
INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Jessica T. Kobos*

I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last twenty years law enforcement has expanded
the use of surveillance technology to keep up with an increase in
criminal activities.' One such technology is thermal imaging. A
thermal image device detects infrared radiation based on heat
emitted from structures. Law enforcement has used thermal
image devices to determine if a private home is emitting an
abnormal amount of heat, a common result of an indoor
2
marijuana growing operation.
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Kyllo
v. United States, 3 law enforcement personnel was permitted to
use thermal image devices without a warrant. The accepted use
*
University of Montana School of Law, class of 2004. Thank you to Professor
Andrew King-Ries, my colleagues on the Montana Law Review, and my parents for their
support and assistance.
1. Mindy G. Wilson, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This
Technological Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth
Amendment ProtectionsAgainst UnreasonableSearches?,83 KY. L. J. 891, 893 (1995).
2. Id.
3. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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of thermal image devices without a warrant was predicated on a
long line of Supreme Court case law, clearly outlining the rights
of private individuals and law enforcement. Interpreting that
case law, nearly every federal circuit allowed the warrantless
use of thermal imaging devices. Based on federal case law, it
appeared the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo would have been
a predictable one: allowing the warrantless use of thermal image
devices. However, the Rehnquist Court, known for its protection
of states rights, appears to have instead followed a trend seen in
several states affording extended privacy rights to individuals.
The Supreme Court's holding in Kyllo rejects its earlier case law
and reasoning concerning law enforcement personnel's use of
technology without a warrant; instead seeming to follow
decisions from two state supreme courts without giving credence
to either.
This comment briefly analyzes the federal case law prior to
Kyllo v. United States and offers an alternative to the Court's
majority holding. Part II discusses the Supreme Court case law
dealing with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III outlines
federal circuit court opinions regarding the constitutionality of
warrantless search and seizure. Part IV outlines the thermal
image discussions from Washington and Montana. Part V
details the facts and holdings of United States v. Kyllo. Part VI
offers an alternative analysis to that offered by the Court in
Kyllo on the warrantless use of thermal image technology by law
enforcement and concludes that the Supreme Court followed a
state trend towards greater privacy protection of individuals as
opposed to following the clearly delineated federal case law and
reasoning.
II. PRECEDENTIAL FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Fourth Amendment provides for "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." 4 The Fourth
Amendment protects ordinary citizens from unjustifiable
government invasion of their private homes and papers. 5
The Fourth Amendment prohibits all searches and seizures
by law enforcement personnel which are unreasonable in

4.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

5.
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, § 1.1(a) (3d ed. 1996).
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nature. 6 A search is reasonable when carried out according to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible
against a defendant under the exclusionary rule. 7 Any evidence
obtained as a result of a search in violation of the Fourth
8
Amendment is also excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
The constitutional issue raised by law enforcement
personnel's use of thermal imaging technology is whether the
use of such a device constitutes a search thus deserving of
Fourth Amendment protection.
A. United States Supreme Court Cases
The cases preceding Kyllo painted a different picture of
when a warrant is required to comply with the Fourth
Amendment than the one depicted in the Kyllo majority opinion.
The cases leading up to Kyllo outlined fairly concise rules as to
when the Fourth Amendment required a warrant before a
method of surveillance could be used by law enforcement.
Thirty-six years of federal case law demonstrated that the use of
a thermal image device by law enforcement personnel without a
warrant was not a search and accordingly not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
In Silverman v. United States, law enforcement used an
electronic listening device called a "spike mike" to eavesdrop on
a building believed to be the headquarters of a gambling
operation. 9 The Court held because the "spike mike" was
inserted in the heating duct of the house, thus turning the
buildings heating system into a conductor of sound, the spike
mike constituted a physical invasion of the home and was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against
warrantless search. 10
Six years later, in Katz v. United States, the Court created
the enduring Katz test determining whether a Fourth

6. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
7. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
8. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). Law enforcement
personnel who engage in warrantless search and seizure may be held civilly liable under
tort law. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
9. 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961). A "spike mike" is a foot-long spike attached to a
microphone, which is inserted into small areas and acts as a transmitter of sounds to
waiting law enforcement. Id. at 506-7.
10. Id. at 509.
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Amendment search had occurred. 1 In Katz, FBI agents placed a
listening and recording device on the outside of a public
telephone booth from which Katz was believed to be
transmitting wagering information across state lines. 12 The
Court held, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places."1 3 The Court clarified what a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even if in his own home, is not subject to Fourth
Amendment protection. 14 In this drastic step the Court shifted
Fourth Amendment interpretation from a narrow focus on the
home, to a broad focus on the person and their subjective
expectations of privacy. In Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
the two prong test for determining if a search occurred was
enunciated: 1) did the individual believe he/she had a subjective
expectation of privacy; and 2) is that individual's objective
expectation of privacy one that society is willing to recognize as
15
reasonable?
In Smith v. Maryland, the Court held the use of a "pen
register" to record the numbers dialed out on a private phone, as
part of a burglary investigation, was not a Fourth Amendment
search. 16 The Court applied the Katz test and found Smith did
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy, nor did the Court
believe that society would recognize such a right as reasonable
because a third party, the phone company, had access to the
information.17
The distinction between open fields and curtilage has been
an important consideration for the Court in past decisions
regarding the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not
8
extend to the open areas surrounding ones personal residence.'
While the area immediately adjacent to the home, that an

11. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 348.
13. Id. at 351.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
16. 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979). "A pen register is a mechanical device that records
the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when
the dial on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does
not indicate whether calls are actually completed." Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States
v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)).
17. Id. at 741-42. The Supreme Court had consistently held that a person had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily turned over to a third
party. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976).
18. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
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individual can expect to remain private has been defined as the
curtilage. 19 In 1984, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
answer two privacy questions concerning the Fourth
Amendment protection of open fields and private homes. 20 In
Oliver v. United States, following a tip law enforcement entered
private property and discovered a field of marijuana plants
approximately a mile from Oliver's home. 21 Oliver was arrested
and indicted for manufacturing a controlled substance. 22 Oliver
later moved to suppress the marijuana claiming it was not found
in an open field as contemplated by Hester v. United States23 and
was thus a violation of his Fourth Amendment right against
warrantless search and seizure. 24 The Court held the special
protection of the Fourth Amendment does not extend to open
fields. An individual may not legitimately expect privacy for any
activities conducted outdoors except in those areas immediately
25
surrounding the home.
26
Later that same year United States v. Karo was decided.
In Karo, several individuals ordered a large amount of ether to
27
be used to extract cocaine from illegally imported clothing.
Federal agents placed a beeper monitor in one of the cans of
ether. 28 After the individuals picked up the cans, the
government was able to track where the cans of ether were
taken. The monitoring enabled the government to discern the
cans of ether had been inside several of the individual's homes.
Using this information the agents filed for search warrants.
After being arrested and indicted, the individuals moved to
suppress the evidence obtained from the monitoring.29 The
Supreme Court upheld the suppression of the evidence based on
the monitoring. The Court believed the beeper provided the
agents with information not made known to the general public,
namely concerning the interior of private residences. 30 Thus, the
19. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). See also, Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
20. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984).
21. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173.
22. Id.
23. 265 U.S. at 57, 59.
24. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 174.
25. Id. at 180. See also, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
26. 468 U.S. 705.
27. Id. at 708.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 709-11.
30. Id. at 715.
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beeper monitoring was a violation of the Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable searches.31
In 1986, two cases resolved the question of whether or not
aerial surveillance constituted a Fourth Amendment search;
Californiav. Ciraolo and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States. 32
In Ciraolo, law enforcement personnel used a private plane to
fly over a home suspected of growing marijuana. 33 At an altitude
of 1,000 feet the officers made naked-eye observations of
numerous marijuana plants growing in Ciraolo's enclosed back
yard. 34 The Court held that because the police observations took
place in public navigable airspace and were not physically
intrusive upon private property there was no legitimate
expectation of privacy. 35 The Court went on to state that society
was not prepared to recognize Ciraolo's expectation that his
"garden" was protected from aerial surveillance, thus failing
36
both prongs of the Katz test.
In Dow Chemical, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) took aerial photographs of a factory complex to monitor
emissions from a facility's power plants without first obtaining a
search warrant. 37 The Court held that the photographs in
question were "not so revealing of intimate details as to raise
constitutional concerns." 38 The taking of aerial photographs of
the Dow plant from public airspace was not a search prohibited
by the Fourth Amendment. 39 Thus, the Fourth Amendment does
not protect anything visible aerially to a third party.
In California v. Greenwood, the Court applied the Katz test
to a private individual's garbage. 40 In Greenwood, the
defendant's garbage was confiscated and searched for evidence
of narcotics after being placed on the curb. 41 Law enforcement
personnel found indications of narcotics use, which was then
42
used to obtain a warrant to search Greenwood's home.
Greenwood appealed claiming the search of his garbage was an
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-15.
476 U.S. 207 (1986); 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
476 U.S. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 212-15.
Id. at 214.
476 U.S. at 232.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 239.
486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 38.
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unlawful invasion of his privacy and a violation of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unlawful searches. 43 The
Court applied the Katz test and found although Greenwood may
have had a subjective expectation of privacy, as in Smith v.
Maryland the case involving law enforcement personnel's use of
a pen register, it was not an expectation society was willing to
recognize as legitimate. 44 The Court reasoned that when garbage
is placed on the curb it becomes "readily accessible to animals,
45
children, scavengers, snoops and other members of the public.
The knowing possibility of exposure to a third party, even in
one's own home or office, negates any Fourth Amendment
46
claim.
B. FederalCircuit Court Trends
The United States Supreme Court is the final word on
federal law and cases with the federal circuit courts acting as
sources of doctrinal development for most legal issues. 47 As such
the federal circuit has increasingly "defined and developed
principles of law and policy directly governing their respective
regions and indirectly affecting the rest of the nation."48 In the
cases preceding Kyllo a majority of federal courts followed the
delineated legal precedent of the Supreme Court and held that
thermal imaging was not a search and therefore not violative of
the Fourth Amendment. 49 The trend in the federal courts
revealed the generally accepted interpretation of the federal
case law surrounding the Fourth Amendment and demonstrated
the inconsistencies of the Kyllo opinion.
In United States v. Penny-Feeney, the district court upheld
the warrantless use of thermal image technology. 50 Following a
lengthy police investigation a couple was charged with growing
marijuana in their home. The couple contended that law

43. Id. at 37.
44. Id. at 41.
45. Id. at 40.
46. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41.
47. Tracey E. George, Developing A Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 1635 (1998).
48. Id. at 1635-36.
49. For a further discussion of the state and federal district court splits on the
warrantless use of thermal image technology see United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp.
1518,1525-31 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
50. 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), affd on other grounds sub nom United States
v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
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enforcement personnel's use of thermal image devices violated
their Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches. The court found that the defendants did not manifest
an actual expectation of privacy in the heat waste produced by
the grow lamps. The court held the couple voluntarily vented the
heat waste outside and in no way attempted to impede its
escape or exercise dominion over it.51 The court went on to state
that even if defendants were capable of demonstrating a
subjective expectation of privacy in the heat waste, the Supreme
Court's holding in Greenwood would suggest that such an
expectation would "not be one that society would be willing to
accept as objectively reasonable." 52 Both cases involved a
homeowner disposing of waste matter in areas exposed to the
general public. 53 Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in upholding the lower court's decision, explicitly
declined to rule on the warrantless use of thermal image
devices, Penny-Feeney was one of the most quoted cases in
support of the warrantless use of such devices because of its
54
clear and succinct analysis.
In United States v. Pinson, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals also found thermal imaging to be an acceptable
warrantless surveillance tool.5 5 The Pinson court relied heavily
on the logic from the Penny-Feeney decision using the analogy
from Greenwood as further evidence of the acceptability of
thermal imaging technology. 56 The court went on to clarify that,
"none of the interests which form the basis for the need for
protection of a residence, namely the intimacy, personal
autonomy, and privacy associated with a home, are threatened
57
by thermal imagery."
In United States v. Ford, the Eleventh Circuit also followed
the logic of Penny-Feeney and Pinson and found thermal imagery
to be a constitutional method of warrantless surveillance. 58 The
Ford court based its decision in large part on the analogous
relationship between Greenwood and cases involving thermal

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1525 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
24 F.3d 1056 (8 h Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1059.
34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
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imaging technology.5 9 The court went on to clarify the inability
of the thermal imager to reveal intimate details of its subjects
activities stating, "the thermal imagery at issue here appears to
be of such low resolution as to render it incapable of revealing
the intimacy of detail and activity protected by the Fourth
60
Amendment."
In United States v. Myers, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held the use of thermal image devices without a
warrant harmless. 6 1 The court held that because Myers took no
steps to conceal or contain the waste heat emissions from his
home he had no subjective expectation of privacy as required by
the first prong of the Katz test. 62 The court went on to clarify
that the thermal imager in question did not "intrude in any way
63
into the privacy and sanctity of the home."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the question
of thermal imaging in United States v. Ishmael.64 In Ishmael, a
married couple was suspected of having constructed a large,
underground, marijuana greenhouse on their property in Texas.
After a tip from a confidential informant, agents from the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) used a thermal imager to twice
measure the amount of heat emanating from the suspected
structure. The first reading taken aerially showed an increased
level of heat being pushed out of the building. The second
reading, taken from the ground, again demonstrated activity
consistent with a drug growing operation. 65 The Ishmaels were
arrested and the building was searched pursuant to a warrant
predicated on telephone records, utility records, and the thermal
image readouts. 66 The search resulted in the confiscation of
firearms and 770 marijuana plants. 67 The Ishmaels challenged
the admission of the evidence of marijuana cultivation based on
the thermal image read-outs. The district court suppressed the
evidence and on appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed. 68 The court
believed the Ishmaels demonstrated a subjective expectation of

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
46
Id.
Id.
48
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 997.
at 996.
F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1995).
at 669.
at 670.
F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
at 851-52.
at 852.
at 853.
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privacy, but failed to agree with their contention that the
government's intrusion upon their subjective expectation of
privacy was not a reasonable one and as such, not to be
recognized by society. 69 The court based its decision on early
cases from other circuit courts, which also found thermal
imaging to be a constitutional surveillance technique not
requiring a warrant. Specifically, the court pointed to the
holdings in Myers and Pinson, that a thermal imager "does not
'70
intrude in any way into the privacy and sanctity of the home.
The federal circuit courts clarified that as demonstrated in
Penny-Feeney, a thermal imager is a passive, non-intrusive
instrument that does not "send any beams or rays into the area
on which it is fixed or in any way penetrate structures within
that area."71 Further the use of a thermal imager posed no
greater an intrusion than other accepted forms of surveillance
like the aerial photography discussed in Dow Chemical or the
pen register at the local phone company as seen in Smith. 72 The
federal circuit had "defined and developed" the case law
surrounding law enforcement personnel's use of thermal image
devices through the preceding case law: the Supreme Court
73
disregarded that progression.
III. WASHINGTON, MONTANA AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVACY CLAUSES

While the federal courts were interpreting the Supreme
Courts case law, several state courts were cultivating a much
more protected privacy right for state citizens. Washington and
Montana's supreme courts were asked to decide whether or not
the use of thermal image devices by law enforcement personnel
was search years before the question was granted certiorari by
the United States Supreme Court. Both states found the use of a
thermal image device without a warrant an unconstitutional
search based on the privacy clauses in their state constitutions.
In 1994, in State v. Young, Washington's Supreme Court
found thermal imaging violative of the state constitution's
protection of citizen's private affairs. 74 In Young, local law

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855-57.
Id. at 85.6.
Id.
Id. at 855-56.
See George, supra note 47.
867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
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enforcement received a tip that an individual was growing
marijuana in his home.7 5 Investigators looked at the individual's
utility bills and later used a thermal imager to scan the home
for abnormal hot spots which were indicative of marijuana
cultivation. The two investigators determined from the thermal
image read outs that there was a marijuana growing operation
in the home. 76 Following Young's conviction on charges of
marijuana possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, he
appealed. Young argued the use of a thermal image read-out as
justification for the warrant was a violation of Article 1, Section
7 of the Washington State Constitution. 77 The Washington
Supreme Court held the use of a thermal image device was a
search and thus a violation of the Washington Constitution,

Article 1, Section

7.78

The Washington Supreme Court based their decision on the
language of Article 1, Section 7, "no person shall be disturbed in
his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law." 79 The court specifically noted that the drafters at the State
Constitutional Convention intentionally rejected the language of
the United State's
Constitutions Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, the Washington Constitution specifically placed a
greater emphasis on the right to privacy than its federal
counterpart.8 0 The court also clarified the difference between the
Katz inquiry under the Fourth Amendment and the Washington
analysis, which questions whether or not the state had
unreasonably intruded into a person's private affairs.8 1 Again
the court stated the private affairs inquiry used in Washington
was far broader than the reasonable expectation test used in the
federal courts. The right of privacy in Washington is not
restricted to "the subjective privacy expectations of modern
citizens who, due to well publicized advances in surveillance
technology, are learning to expect diminished privacy in many
aspects of their lives."8 2 The protection afforded to citizens of
Washington under the private affairs inquiry goes so far as to
limit warrantless access to individual's utility bills, and
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 595.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 599.
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
Young, 867 P.2d at 596.
Id. at 597. See also State v. Myrick, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
Young, 867 P.2d at 597.
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overruling the federal case Greenwood, granting citizens a
83
measure of privacy concerning their garbage.
Clearly a heightened level of privacy protection exists in
Washington based on its state constitution. The logic behind the
state court's opinion regarding the use of thermal imaging is
apparent. The court protected the rights of its citizens as
dictated by its own interpretation of the Washington
Constitution and its own case law.
In 1997, in State v. Siegel, the state of Montana was also
confronted with the question of warrantless thermal imaging by
law enforcement.8 4 In Siegel, law enforcement used a thermal
imager to scan a shed suspected of housing a marijuana grow
operation. The building registered a reading consistent with the
heat produced by the grow lamps necessary to sustain
marijuana plants.8 5 Based on the read out from the thermal
imager and information obtained from citizen informants a
search warrant was issued. The search yielded marijuana and
marijuana plants.8 6 Siegel, one of three individuals arrested,
was charged with criminal possession with intent to sell and
criminal production or manufacture of a dangerous drug under
Montana law.8 7 After pleading guilty, Siegel appealed the
district court's denial of his motion to suppress all evidence
linked with law enforcement's warrantless use of a thermal
imager.8 8 The Montana Supreme Court held that under the
state's heightened privacy rights warrantless thermal imaging
was a violation of the Montana Constitution Article II, Sections

10 and 11.89
The Montana Supreme Court based its decision squarely on
the privacy language found in Article II, Section 10 and 11 of the
Montana Constitution. Article II, section 10 of the Montana
Constitution states: "Right of Privacy. The right of individual
privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest." 90 The Montana court relied on the U.S. Supreme
83. Young, 867 P.2d at 604 n.3. See also In re Rosier, 717 P.2d 1353 (Wash. 1986);
State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990).
84. 281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d 176 (1997).
85. Siegel, 281 Mont. at 254, 934 P.2d at 178.
86. Siegel, 281 Mont. at 255, 934 P.2d at 178-79.
87. Siegel, 281 Mont. at 255, 934 P.2d at 179 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 45-9-103;
110).
88. Siegel, 281 Mont. at 256, 934 P.2d at 180.
89. Siegel, 281 Mont. at 257, 934 P.2d at 180.
90. MONT. CONST. art. II, §10.
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Court's holdings in Katz and Smith, including the two-prong
Katz test. However, the court also used the "unique privacy
provisions" found in Montana's Constitution. 9 1 The Montana
Constitution affords broader protection to citizens than does the
Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The Montana
Supreme Court went further and clarified when independent
grounds exist for a decision to break with federal law, that
federal law will not bind Montana. 92 The Montana court applied
the Katz test and found Siegel did have a subjective expectation
of privacy as to his property based on the steps taken to
demarcate the property as private. Siegel's property contained,
"No Trespassing" signs, fencing and an enclosed shed. 9 3 The
second prong of the Katz test was also upheld under an earlier
holding which grants a citizen of Montana an "expectation of
privacy in an area of land that is beyond the curtilage which the
society of this state is willing to recognize as reasonable." 94 The
Montana court stated Montanan's would be "shocked" if the
court were to allow warrantless thermal imaging of private
95
residences.
Texts from the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention
also speak to the framers' intentions to create a right of privacy
on par with other inalienable rights. 96 Finally, the court
concluded that absent a compelling state interest, other than the
enforcement of the criminal code, thermal imaging without a
warrant was a violation of Article II, Section 10 and 11 of the
97
Montana Constitution.
While the structure of the analysis between the Washington
and Montana courts is fundamentally the same as that applied
by the Supreme Court the difference lies in the privacy clauses
imbedded in the states constitutions. While it makes perfect
sense under the heightened expectation of privacy in
Washington and Montana to disallow the use of thermal image
devices without a warrant, the same cannot be said in a federal
system void of just such a constitutionally protected heightened
91. Siegel, 281 Mont. at 262, 934 P.2d at 183.
92. Siegel, 281 Mont. at 263, 934 P.2d at 183. See also State v. Solis, 214 Mont.
310, 693 P.2d 518 (1984).
93. Siegel, 281 Mont. at 274, 934 P.2d at 190.
94. Id. (quoting State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 384, 901 P.2d 61, 75-76 (1995)).
95. Id.
96. Siegel, 281 Mont. at 276, 934 P.2d at 191-92 (quoting Delegate Campbell,
Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, pages 168182).
97. Siegel, 281 Mont. at 278, 934 P.2d at 192.
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expectation of privacy.

IV. KYLLO V. UNITED STATES
In Kyllo v. United States 98 the Supreme Court was asked to
address ever developing technology and its collision course with
the Fourth Amendment. As surveillance technology continued to
evolve, law enforcement personnel's arsenal of tools also evolved.
This created a situation where the proverbial lines between
privacy and public safety began to blur for law enforcement
agencies as advanced surveillance technology, specifically
thermal imaging, became a tool in the war against drugs in the
United States. 99
A. Facts and Lower Courts Holding
In 1991, the United States Department of the Interior
suspected Danny Kyllo was running a marijuana growing
operation out of his home, a triplex in Florence, Oregon. In order
to corroborate the informant's tip and to gather further
evidence, agents went to Kyllo's address to scan the area with
an Agema Thermovision 210. The agents scanned the front and
back of the home while remaining in their vehicle. The thermal
imager showed uncharacteristic warmth on the roof over the
garage and in a sidewall of Kyllo's home as compared to his
neighbors' homes. 10 0
A Federal Magistrate Judge issued a search warrant for
Kyllo's home based on utility bills, informants' tips, and the
thermal image read out. During the search of Kyllo's home
agents found an indoor growing operation with over 100 plants.
The government indicted Kyllo on one count of manufacturing
marijuana.' 0 '
In Federal District Court Kyllo moved to suppress the
evidence seized from his home. Following denial of his motion,
Kyllo entered a guilty plea conditional to his appeal. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to the
District Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine the
intrusiveness of thermal imaging. The District Court held
thermal imaging was non-intrusive and thus no warrant was

98.

533 U.S. 27 (2001).

99.

See supra note 1.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.

100.
101.

Id.
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required. The lower court reasoned that the device "did not show
any people or activity within the walls of the structure." 102 Based
upon their findings the District Court upheld the validity of the
warrant based on thermal imaging and reaffirmed the denial of
10 3
Kyllo's motion to suppress.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
lower court decision. The Ninth Circuit held that Kyllo had not
subjectively manifested his intent to protect his privacy by
concealing the heat emanations from his home. Moreover, even
if Kyllo had tried to hide the emanations, there was no
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy for "amorphous 'hot
104
spots' on the roof and exterior wall."
On application to the United States Supreme Court the
question before the court was whether or not warrantless
thermal imaging of a private residence was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search
5
and seizure. 0
B. Majority Holding
The U.S. Supreme Court held warrantless exterior thermal
imaging of a private home was a violation of an individual's
right to be free from unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court stated that any sense-enhancing
technology that would permit law enforcement access to
information otherwise not available without physical intrusion
10 6
into the home was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court first looked to determine if the warrantless use of
a thermal image device was a search under the Katz test. 0 7 The
Court specifically looked to whether or not "the individual
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of
the challenged search" and whether society was willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable. 0 8 The Court explained
that under the modified Katz test, neither the pen register in
Smith'0 9 nor the aerial surveillance in Ciraolo' 0 constituted
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 29.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33 (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211).
442 U.S. at 743-744.
476 U.S. at 211.
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searches under the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court
distinguished the use of a thermal image device from the use of
advanced aerial surveillance equipment because the area being
viewed was immediately adjacent to a private home "where
privacy expectations are most heightened."1 1 ' Based on the
heightened expectation the Court afforded to a private home and
the area immediately adjacent to that home, the information
acquired by the thermal imager was held to be the result of a
112
search.
The Court went on to clarify that a bright line exists at the
entrance of an individual's home and to withdraw any protection
from that area of law would be "to permit police technology to
3
erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.""
The Court created a "general public use" standard to clarify
which technology requires a warrant. "General public use" was
defined as when the government uses a device generally
available to the public to explore details of a home. 114 Any
information obtained as a result of surveillance by technology
available to the general public is not a search and does not
requires a warrant to fall within the confines of the Fourth
5
Amendment."
The Court dismissed the Government's contention that
thermal imaging was constitutional because it only detected
heat radiating from the external surfaces of the home. 116 The
Court held that all details of a home should be considered
intimate details, including how warm or cold an individual
17
keeps their residence.
The use of a thermal image device was ruled a search and
held to be an unconstitutional violation of an individual's Fourth
Amendment protection against warrantless search and
seizure.118
C. Dissent
The four dissenting Justices argued that the majority
created a new, unclear rule when the previous rule had been
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (quoting Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 213).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 38.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
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clearly delineated by the Court's own case law. The dissent
characterized the majority opinion as "unprecedented [and]
quite difficult to take seriously." 119 The Fourth Amendment
protects against searches and seizures inside a home and the
technology involved in this case is dealing only with emanations
detected outside of a home. 120 The dissent based its opinion on
the basic principle that "what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
2
Amendment protection."' '
The dissent argued that there exists a distinction between
"through the wall surveillance" and "off the wall surveillance."1 22
"Through the wall surveillance" applies when the method of
surveillance allows the user to have direct access to information
in otherwise constitutionally protected areas. "Off the wall
surveillance" is taken from the outside of the home. 23 The use of
"off the wall surveillance" does not invade an area otherwise
constitutionally protected nor does the dissent believe that heat
emanations are protected as part of the home. 124 Kyllo
specifically vented his home to release the increased amount of
25
heat in his home from his growing operation.
The dissent argued that by strictly following the Katz test
the Court should have upheld the warrantless thermal imaging
as constitutional. The first prong of the Katz test asks whether
or not the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the area being searched. The dissent argued that the
homeowner had a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning
only what takes place within the home. The thermal imaging in
question did not obtain "any information regarding the interior
of the home." 26 The dissent determined that the exterior
venting of Kyllo's home removed any subjective expectation of
privacy Kyllo could have possessed. 27
The dissent looked to the second half of the Katz test as to
whether society would recognize a drug grower's expectation of

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 43 (J. Stevens, dissenting).
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 43.
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privacy for his ventilation of the heat from his marijuana crop. 128
The dissent stated they were confident that an individual's
expectation that heat waves would remain private was "surely
1 29
not 'one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The Court had previously held that warrantless searches of
property in plain view are constitutional. 130 The dissent found it
difficult to comprehend that the framers intended to protect the
venting of heat emanations from a drug grower's home under
the Fourth Amendment protection against the warrantless
physical intrusion of the home.' 3' The dissent compares the
inference obtained by a thermal image device with the similar
inference that can be obtained by looking through someone's
garbage once it is placed outside the home.' 32 The indirect
information obtained through both methods of surveillance
should not be constitutionally protected. An inference should not
33
be considered a constitutionally protected search.
The dissent concluded by commending the majority on its
attempt to protect citizens from threats to privacy by advancing
technology, however, they also pointed out that the majority
opinion is a perfect demonstration of a lack of judicial restraint.
The dissent instead would have preferred the majority to leave
the regulation of surveillance equipment to legislators "rather
than to shackle them with prematurely devised constitutional

constraints."134
V. ANALYSIS

The Court's decision in Kyllo was a blanket decision
attempting to cover all advances in surveillance technology
while ignoring previous case law and the lower courts
interpretation of that case law. The Rehnquist Court, known for
its conservative majority, often focuses its attention on state
rights. 135 States like Washington and Montana had already sent
a clear message to the high court and the bench was listening.
The Supreme Courts holding in Kyllo seemed to follow decisions
128. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 44.
129. Id. at 44 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
130. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586.
131. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47-48.
132. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
133. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 44.
134. Id. at 51.
135. Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation of State Action
During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L.REv. 1301, 1303 (2002).
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from two state supreme courts, based on state constitution
privacy clauses, summarily rejecting earlier federal case law and
reasoning concerning law enforcement personnel's use of
technology without a warrant.
First, the federal case law that existed prior to Kyllo painted
a clear picture of when surveillance technology could be utilized
by law enforcement without a warrant. If the Court had properly
applied the Katz test, under the previous federal case law, the
warrantless thermal imaging of a private home would not be a
violation of the Fourth Amendment as demonstrated by the
many federal courts having used that standard. Starting with
the Silverman case, the Court made it very clear that while the
home was to be considered a protected private sphere, it was not
absolute. 136 In Katz, a test was created to determine when a
privacy expectation is protected, but the Court went on to clarify
that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection."1 37 Following the logic of the Court's reasoning,
anything vented to the outside of a home should be considered
exposed to the public and not subject to Fourth Amendment
protection. The increased warm air vented to the outside of a
small triplex community would most definitely be noticed by the
neighbors, this analysis points to one of the problems in the
138
Kyllo opinion.
A correct application of the Katz test, as developed by the
aforementioned case law should have led the Court to find that
the warrantless thermal imaging of a private residence is an
acceptable tool of law enforcement. The first prong of the Katz
test asks whether the individual had a subjective expectation of
privacy to the area being searched, if so, was society willing to
recognize such an expectation as reasonable? If both prongs of
the Katz test are met then the act was a search and falls under
Fourth Amendment protection. 39 In Kyllo, the suspect was
growing over 100 marijuana plants in a community of triplex
apartments; he was aware of his increased utility usage and the
1 40
excess heat that had to be vented to the exterior of his home.
The evidence obtained through the cursory thermal image scan
was information readily obtainable from Kyllo's utility company
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

365 U.S. at 511.
389 U.S. at 351.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
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as well as from observant neighbors.
Because common sense dictates that air vents release the
air from a private home into public airspace it would have been
a much more logical step for the Court to have likened such
activity to the aerial surveillance discussed in Ciraolo and Dow
Chemical. In both Ciraolo and Dow Chemical aerial surveillance
was upheld without a warrant because the flyovers of private
homes were not considered a search at all. 1 41 Further, under the

Court's holding in Oliver, the case involving a marijuana crop in
an open field adjacent to a private home, the Fourth
Amendment does not extend to open fields. 142 The heated air
surrounding the home that was used by the crude thermal
imaging equipment to show "amorphous hot spots" by the
federal agents would not be considered a search under the case
law created in both the aerial surveillance and open field cases.
Under a correct application of the Katz test, no search
occurred, so it would be unnecessary to move on to the second
prong of the Katz test. 143 However, under the correct application
of the case law pertaining to the second prong of the Katz test,
thermal imaging technology would also not be considered by
society as a violation of a legitimate privacy expectation.
Although the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
"draws a firm line at the entrance to the house," the technology
involved was not an invasion of privacy as no intimate details
were observable. 144

Second, although technology has advanced since 1991, and
the Court's decision in 2001, the only piece of equipment before
the court was the crude, low tech Thermo Vision 210, and thus
any speculation as to other technologies or possible privacy
invasions was inappropriate. However, even with the
advancements in technology over the last decade the problem
does not lie with the Court's holding but with the logic behind
the decision. The technology available today certainly makes it
easier to understand why the Court made such a far-reaching
decision, but herein lies the problem. The Court's decision was
based on the fear of marauding bands of law enforcement
peering into individual homes without restraint and not on the
existing federal case law.

141.
142.
143.
144.

476 U.S. at 218; 476 U.S. at 238.
466 U.S. at 176.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
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The Court makes it clear that the opinion being rendered in
Kyllo was not being limited to the facts presented; instead the
Court attempted to answer all questions regarding technological
advances in surveillance equipment with its general public use
doctrine. 145 If a device is in general public use then it is
acceptable to use without a warrant, any high tech devices
would be relegated to the land of the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement. 146 In the facts presented in Kyllo general
police work would have produced the same results and facts for
a warrant. A walk about the premises, on the public sidewalks, a
conversation with neighbors concerning strange warm areas in
adjacent yards, or strange odors coming from a nearby vent
would all have given law enforcement the same information that
the general thermal image scan produced. 147 All of the available
extrinsic evidence would allow law enforcement the same
information following further investigation, thus overcoming the
Karo standard that the information garnered cannot be
discoverable only from inside the home. 148 The key behind law
enforcements use of thermal imaging is the ability to quickly
answer questions concerning possible drug manufacturing.
Although the inferences discovered through the use of a
thermal image device were crude in the facts of Kyllo,
technology continues to develop at an astonishing rate. The
difficulty with the Kyllo decision is that the Court was asked a
specific question regarding technology that measured the
external temperature of a home from a public vantage point and
turned it into one of the foremost cases on an individual's right
to privacy in the home. Technology does continue to develop but
the Court should have followed its own advice,
"Fourth
149
Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case."
While the protection extended to private homes by the U.S.
Constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court is of high importance
it should not be placed above the paramount goal of the court
system, which should be to create unambiguous law to be
applied by the rest of judiciary. It was inappropriate of the
Court to disregard the law and generically extend the holding in
Kyllo to still unrealized technology. The application of any right
created out of the mists of the halls of justice creates a slippery
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

533 U.S. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 43.
468 U.S. at 718-19.
Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238, n.5.
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slope, which could allow for further seemingly random decisions.
Finally, both the Washington and the Montana supreme
courts describe the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution as "provid[ing] the minimum protection afforded
citizens against unreasonable searches by the government."1 50
While both states also tackled the Fourth Amendment analysis,
their holdings were based on state law. The logic used by both
states to end the warrantless use of thermal imaging technology
is compelling. Both state courts realized their constitutions
offered more protection than the federal government and
qualified their holdings based strictly on their state laws. But
surprisingly, the United States Supreme Court was able to
fashion an opinion that more closely resembled the state court
decisions than any other previous federal opinion regarding
privacy and all of this was accomplished without the aid of the
specific privacy clauses used by the state supreme courts.
VI. CONCLUSION

It appears the United States Supreme Court looked at two
well crafted state opinions and saw a level of privacy they
believed should exist for all citizens under the federal
government. However, under the federal case law and the
rulings of lower federal courts such a far reaching right to
privacy does not make sense. The Supreme Court demonstrated
a lack of judicial restraint when it silently adopted as the new
federal mandate the logic of state courts with privacy clauses.
Not only did the Court change the direction of privacy law in the
United States but it also created a privacy right established on
weak precedent and state court decisions based on state
constitution privacy clauses. Several issues were never even
addressed by the majority opinion. For instance, when does a
surveillance device become available for general public use, the
new standard created in Kyllo? Is it when the item can be
purchased online, or when it is available on the shelves of
Walmart? An even larger question looms with regard to the
Kyllo holding for non-residential buildings. With the majority's
focus on the importance of protecting the sanctity of the home,
does the Kyllo holding extend to a marijuana operation in an
office building?' 5 ' Unfortunately, in its eagerness to protect
150. Young, 867 P.2d at 596; Siegel, 281 Mont. at 275, 934 P.2d at 191.
151. Currently the Fourth Amendment protection of offices and commercial
buildings is based upon the perceived expectation of privacy and societies willingness to
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privacy from technological advancements the Court created a
rule that only muddies the scope of constitutional warrantless
searches and leaves more unanswered questions than legal
guidance.

recognize that expectation, however, this would most likely be subject to review following
the logic of the Kyllo opinion. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978);
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 355 (1977).
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